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Abstract 
PAI Coin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism utilizes the double SHA-256 hashing 
protocol— the same mechanism used by Bitcoin Core. This compatibility with classic 
Bitcoin-style mining provides low barrier to entry for PAI Coin mining, consequently rendering 
the PAI Coin network vulnerable to so-called 51% attacks, among others. To mitigate such risks, 
this paper proposes a hybrid Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism and 
provides a detailed technical analysis of how such a mechanism would counter some of the PAI 
Coin network's inherent vulnerabilities, if successfully implemented. A detailed technical outline 
of blockchain-based PoW & PoS consensus, including their advantages and disadvantages, 
when used both independently and in the context of the hybrid model, is provided. An economic 
analysis of attacking a hybrid-powered PAI Coin network is presented, and a final 
recommendation for future development of PAI Coin consensus is made. 
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 Glossary of Terms 
● PoW — ​Proof of Work​; A consensus scheme where the probability of mining a block 
depends on the work done by the miner. 
● PoS  — ​Proof of Stake​; A consensus scheme where the probability of mining a block 
depends on the amount of cryptocurrency one holds. 
● ASIC — ​Application-Specific Integrated Circuit​; An integrated circuit designed 
specifically for a particular use, e.g., mining cryptocurrencies. The specificity of the 
design may give rise to improved performance. 
● DCR — ​Decred​; A cryptocurrency using a Hybrid PoW/PoS consensus scheme. 
● KYC — ​Know Your Customer​; T​he process of verifying the identity and business intent 
of a potential client. 
● Dapps — ​Decentralized Applications​; A​n application run by many users on a 
decentralized network with trustless protocols, designed to avoid any single point of 
failure [2]. 
● UTXO — ​Unspent Transaction Output​; a​n output of a blockchain transaction that has not 
been spent, and therefore can be used as an input to a new transaction [25]. 
● P2P — ​Peer-to-peer​; a distributed application architecture that partitions tasks or 
workloads among peers. Peers are equally privileged, equipotent participants in the 
application [3]. 
● DDoS — ​Distributed Denial-of-Service​; an attack by which a machine’s or network’s 
services are disrupted by flooding the target with traffic originating from many different 
sources. 
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 Introduction 
PAI Coin [4] is a UTXO-based, Proof-of-Work (PoW)-powered cryptocurrency, created as a 
code fork of Bitcoin Core. PAI Coin introduces additional features and functionalities on top of 
Bitcoin, such as decentralized data sharing [5]. Applications utilizing the PAI Coin protocol 
include authentication for ObEN Inc.’s consumer Personal AI [6]. PAI Coin also serves as a 
transactional medium for the PAI ecosystem. 
 
As a code fork of Bitcoin Core, PAI Coin’s Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism utilizes the 
double SHA-256 hashing protocol. As such, PAI Coin is wholly compatible with Bitcoin-style 
mining, and indeed, any mining software or device able to mine Bitcoin can also mine PAI Coin. 
Due to the large amount of Bitcoin-compatible hash power in existence—much of it idle due to 
obsolescence [7]—PAI Coin, in its current state, is vulnerable to potentially catastrophic attack 
vectors, like 51% attacks and strip mining, among others. 
 
The Project PAI contributing developers have always been aware of this circumstance. As an 
interim solution, PAI Coin currently implements a ​coinbase address whitelist​ at the protocol level 
[8]. This means that, when a miner submits a new block, in addition to the standard block 
validations performed in ​CheckBlock()​, the specified coinbase payout address must match 
one of those on the mining address whitelist [9]. This prevents miners not in control of a 
whitelisted address from earning block rewards, thereby disincentivizing the aforementioned 
attack vectors. 
 
The Project PAI contributing developers anticipated that Project PAI evolve “to fulfill the current 
needs” of the Project and that “[i]f alternatives ... are empirically proven to be substantially 
beneficial, then those alternatives will be adopted in place of or alongside the ... initial base 
technologies.” [4] In response to the desire for broader public mining, Project PAI has been 
working towards identifying solutions that would allow for the safe removal of the coinbase 
address whitelist. To this end, this report proposes a Hybrid Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake 
consensus protocol, motivated in part by current technological progress in the field. Adoption of 
this proposal would lead to a number of improvements, including public and accessible mining, 
greater decentralization, better energy efficiency via coin staking, wider distribution of coins, a 
more secure P2P network, and a more robust ecosystem. 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Benefits and drawbacks of popular 
consensus mechanisms are outlined in Section 1. A careful review of the proposed hybrid 
consensus mechanism is given in Section 1.3. Candidate hash functions, the algorithmic 
backbone of Proof of Work, are reviewed in Section 2. Finally, Section 3 comprises the overall 
recommendation for consensus change, and outlines a plan for integration and deployment. 
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 Section 1 — Practical Consensus Mechanisms 
1.1 Proof of Work (PoW) 
The classic and most common consensus mechanism is Proof of Work (PoW). In PoW, creation 
of a valid block requires a miner to demonstrate proof of work by offering the solution to a 
mathematical problem that is “hard” to compute but “easy” to verify. Generally speaking, the 
probability a given miner adds a new block to the blockchain is proportional to the amount of 
computational power to which he or she has access.  Some oft-cited drawbacks of PoW are 
increasingly high physical resources, usage/cost, and decreasing user engagement, brought 
about by increasingly centralized hash power over time. 
1.1.1 Advantages 
Some noted advantages of PoW are [10]:  
● Resistance to DDoS attacks 
○ Proof of Work imposes certain restrictions on the actions of the participants, 
because the task requires considerable effort. Effective attacks usually require 
immense computational resources, thus affording protection through economic 
disincentivization. 
● L​ow impact of coin holdings 
○ As noted above, forming new blocks depends solely on computational resources, 
regardless of how much stake one holds. Therefore, holders of large amounts of 
coin are not directly afforded the right to make decisions for the entire network. 
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 1.1.2 Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities 
Majority Attack 
 
Figure 1. Double Spend Attack 
 
A ​majority attack​, or ​51% attack​, can occur when a network participant controls more than 50% 
of the network hash rate. By having more hash power than all other network participants 
combined, the attacker can, on average, produce and verify blocks faster than the rest of the 
network. This, in combination with the longest chain rule [24], allows the attacker to inject 
illegitimate transactions into blocks and subsequently verify them. One achievable outcome of a 
majority attack is a double spend, exemplified below. 
Example 
As shown in Figure 1, an attacker, Bob, purchases a product from a merchant, Alice, by 
submitting a transaction to her. This transaction is included in Block ​a​, where ​a​ is an integer 
index. Privately, Bob mines an alternative blockchain fork in which a fraudulent double-spend 
transaction is included in Block ​a’​. After waiting for ​n​ confirmations, i.e., when Block ​a​+​n​ is 
mined, the merchant, Alice, sends the product to Bob. If Bob controls more than 50% of the 
network hashrate, he can continue to mine his private fraudulent blockchain until it becomes 
longer than the branch built by the honest network. When Block ​a’​+​m​+1, for some integer ​m​>​n​, 
is mined, Bob can release his fraudulent fork publicly, and it will be recognized as the valid 
blockchain due to the longest chain rule. 
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 Strip Mining  6
Network difficulty is adjusted after a given number of blocks , in an attempt to achieve a stable 7
average block time . An attacker controlling a considerable amount of idle network hashpower 8
can generate new blocks very quickly. When the difficulty readjustment height is reached, the 
network difficulty will increase significantly , perhaps to a level too high for other miners to mine 9
successfully. Further, if the attacker suddenly quits mining after difficulty readjustment, the block 
time will increase substantially, effectively freezing the network, and resulting in a large pool of 
unconfirmed transactions. 
Sybil Attack 
An attacker can gain a disproportionately large influence over a P2P network by forging a large 
number of pseudonymous identities. It is possible for some nodes to connect to attack nodes 
only and be isolated from the honest network. This can be further exploited in the following ways 
[11].  
 
An attacker can: 
1. Refuse to relay blocks and transactions. 
2. Relay only her own blocks, splitting honest nodes from the network. 
3. Filter out some transactions with 0 confirmations, e.g., to execute a double spend attack. 
4. Execute a timing attack by watching transmissions from honest nodes and analyzing the 
time of execution, to compromise the low-latency encryption/anonymization of 
blockchain transmissions. 
1.2 Proof of Stake (PoS) 
Proof of Stake is another popular consensus mechanism in which the miner’s (i.e., staker’s) 
probability of creating a new block is proportional to the relative volume of the stake he or she 
puts forth. PoS is a general concept—there are many different implementations. As an example, 
the stake may consist of the same cryptocurrency tokens transacted on the blockchain in 
question (e.g., Peercoin, Cardano), or the stake may consist of voting tickets (e.g., Decred). In 
some implementations, all tokens are issued upon genesis of the blockchain (e.g., NXT, NEM); 
in others, they are not (e.g., Decred, Peercoin, NEO, Cardano). 
1.2.1 Advantages 
PoS is purported to address some of the shortcomings of PoW, including high cost, energy 
inefficiency, and susceptibility to centralization. 
6 The authors thank Alex Waters and Jonathan Silverman for providing an assessment of the vulnerabilities of 
PoW-based blockchains. 
7 ​Difficulty readjusts every 2,016 blocks in PAI Coin. 
8 ​The PAI Coin target block time is 10 minutes. 
9 PAI Coin’s network difficulty can change by no more than a factor of 4 at a given time. 
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Instead of huge amounts of processing power, PoS attempts to use security deposits as a 
deterrent to incentivize participants to follow the rules of the network. Participants are not 
allowed to propose or validate blocks unless they first submit a deposit of cryptocoins. If 
participants attempt to cheat the network, they lose a portion or all of their security deposit. By 
removing the need for computational resources, PoS is able to maintain network security while 
dramatically reducing energy consumption. 
 
In PoS-based blockchains, block time can feasibly be set to a much lower level than in 
PoW-based blockchains , because security does not depend on the difficulty of a 10
computational puzzle. By reducing block time, PoS-based blockchains reduce confirmation 
latency and can support a greater number of transactions per second.  
 
In PoS-based blockchains, the likelihood of a staker’s block being added to the blockchain is 
proportional to the amount of cryptocoins the user stakes. It is arguable that PoS is (a) more 
efficient and less wasteful due to its non-reliance on computational resources for transactions 
confirmation, (b) more resistant to centralization given the lower barrier to entry, and thus (c) 
ultimately provides a solution more amenable to sustainable decentralization than PoW. 
1.2.2 Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities 
Nothing-at-Stake Attack 
In PoW, miners are incentivized to mine on a single (longest) chain because of the potentially 
substantial computational cost of mining across multiple chains simultaneously. In PoS, 
however, the computational cost of mining is nonexistent. Therefore, given multiple blockchain 
forks, an optimal (greedy) strategy is to vote on all forks simultaneously, so the validator may be 
rewarded regardless of the outcome of the fork. 
 
The so-called Nothing-at-Stake Attack pragmatically assumes that all miners act 
greedily—building on every fork—and are not altruistic. Under such assumptions, even with only 
1% of the total stake, an attacker's double-spent fork would win when everyone else is also 
staking on both. If there are some altruistic miners in the network, an attacker may have to buy 
more stake or bribe other validators, but it is still relatively easier to conduct a double-spend 
attack via Nothing-at-Stake, than in PoW. 
 
Some approaches to mitigate the Nothing-at-Stake Attack have been proposed: 
● Ethereum Slasher 1.0 uses a security deposit-based PoS algorithm; if a miner is caught 
voting on multiple forks, the security deposit is taken away [12]. 
● Ethereum Slasher 2.0 penalizes voters that vote on the “wrong fork,” but not voters that 
double vote [1]. 
10 Ethereum block time is 15 seconds, Bitcoin’s is 10 minutes. 
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 ● Peercoin [26] uses the chain with the highest consumed coin age, defined as the sum of 
the total number of coins staked for each block multiplied by the amount of time those 
coins were staked. 
● NXT [27] eliminates the block reward, letting transaction fees dictate the process. 
● In EOS’s Delegated Proof of Stake (dPoS) , shareholders put their stake toward voting 11
for block producers. The number of validators is fixed and the order is decided each 
round. 
● In Algorand [28], accounts/nodes are selected randomly, with probability proportional to 
coin holdings, through a cryptographic sortition process to form a committee. The 
committee then uses a BFT consensus method to produce blocks. 
● Hybrid PoW/PoS consensus attempts to eliminate the shortcomings of PoW and PoS in 
isolation by tying them together. 
1.3 Hybrid Proof of Work & Proof of Stake (PoW/PoS)  
The drawbacks of PoW and PoS motivate us to explore safer alternatives for on-chain 
consensus. The properties of Hybrid PoW/PoS make it a potential candidate. For example, 
Hybrid PoW/PoS offers, among other things: 
 
● Greater protection against majority attacks by requiring PoW miners and PoS validators 
to depend on each other. 
● A lower barrier to entry for network participation. 
● Better energy efficiency. 
● Potentially greater network stability via collateral benefits, such as incentives for 
maintaining always-online nodes. 
 
There are various implementations of Hybrid PoW/PoS. We propose the following design, 
inspired by Decred [14] (DCR)’s Proof of Activity [15]. 
1.3.1 Overview 
As its name implies, there are two principal components of a hybrid PoW/PoS consensus 
mechanism: Proof-of-Work mining and Proof-of-Stake block voting. PoW miners are responsible 
for producing and submitting new candidate blocks. PoS stakeholders confirm that a candidate 
block should be appended to the blockchain by voting. A network node can be either a PoW 
miner, a PoS stakeholder, or both at the same time. 
 
PoW mining is done in the classic Nakamoto style: miners perpetually generate nonces (i.e., 
single-use random numbers) to, in combination with data like the previous block hash and the 
current block’s merkle root, create different hashes until one is found that is lower than a 
dynamically calculated threshold (i.e., target). 
11 Invented by Dan Larimer in 2013. Current blockchains utilizing DPoS: EOS, BitShares, Steem, Golos, Ark, Lisk, 
PeerPlays, Nano (formerly Raiblocks) and Tezos. Loosely based on DPoS: Cosmos/Tendetmint, Cardano [13]. 
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In the PoS component, stakeholders are chosen at random and given the opportunity to vote on 
the validity of a candidate block. Once a stakeholders coins have been locked for a certain 
amount of time, i.e., the staking period, the stakeholder becomes a potential verifier for the new 
block. At each block height, a group of ​m​ stakeholders are chosen randomly from all potential 
verifiers, with probabilities proportional to the amount of cryptocoins one staked. These ​m 
stakeholders will decide the validity of a new block by ​n​-of-​m​ voting: if a majority of them confirm 
the new block’s validity, the block will be appended to the blockchain. The block will contain all 
m​ stakeholders’ votes, in addition to a list of staking invoices. Each staking invoice enumerates 
a stakeholder’s  staking amounts, staking fees paid and return addresses. It serves as a 12
confirmation of staking activity at the current block height. To verify the voting stakeholder’s 
voting right, all stakeholder votes link to a previous staking invoice at a smaller block height. 
 
The block reward is distributed among the PoW miner who produced the block, ​m​ stakeholders 
who verified the block, and/or other parties. The distribution parameter is tunable. For example, 
in Decred, 60% is assigned to the PoW miner, 30% to 5 stakeholders (6% each) and 10% to the 
contributing developers. If a PoW miner doesn't include all ​m​ votes, their subsidy is reduced by 
1/​m​ for every missing vote. 
Staking Mechanism Example 
Suppose Alice is a PoS stakeholder who wants to stake some of her cryptocoins to vote on 
block verification.  
 
1. Alice broadcasts to the network that she is willing to pay a staking fee to stake a certain 
amount of cryptocoins. 
2. A PoW miner (Bob) creates a new block at block height ​h​ and packs Alice’s staking 
activity information into the staking invoice. The staking fee is paid to Bob and 
non-refundable. The cryptocoins staked by Alice is locked. 
3. Alice is eligible to vote within an expiry time window, which starts from block h+256 and 
ends at block h+256+W. For each candidate block generated by PoW miners, ​m​ eligible 
stakeholders are chosen randomly to verify the candidate block, with probabilities 
proportional to the amount they’ve staked. 
4. Expiry time window’s width W depends on the total network stake, so that Alice has a 
high probability of being chosen as a verifier within the expiry time window. 
5. If Alice, within an expiry time window 
a. is chosen as a verifier and votes on a block 
b. is chosen, but offline and misses the chance to vote (i.e., node offline) 
c. is not chosen as a verifier 
Her funds (stakes, block reward if applicable, minus the staking fee) stay locked for the 
next 256 blocks, after which they’re released. 
12 May or may not be the voting stakeholder’s. 
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 1.3.2 Technical Parameters 
A comparison of the technical parameters of the current PoW-based Project PAI and the Hybrid 
PoW/PoS Decred blockchains are shown in the following table: 
 
 Project PAI, current Decred 
Hash Algorithm SHA-256 BLAKE-256 
Total Supply 2,100,000,000 21,000,000 
Target Block Time 10 minutes 5 minutes 
Difficulty Retargeting Interval 2,016 blocks (2 weeks) 144 blocks (1.25 days) 
Block Reward Reduction 
Ratio 
50/100 100/101 
Block Reward Reduction 
Interval 
210,000 blocks (4 years) 6,144 blocks (21 days, 8 
hours) 
Block Reward Distribution 100% to PoW miner 60% to PoW miner + 30% to 
stakeholders (6% each) + 
10% to development team 
Launch Date 2/23/2018 2/8/2016 
Estimated Mining Lifetime Until 2154 Until 2120 
Initial Block Reward after 
Genesis 
1,500 31.19582664 
Table 1. Project PAI & Decred Technical Parameters Comparison Table 
 
Decred is an example of a Hybrid Proof-of-Work/Proof-of-Stake blockchain. The PAI Coin 
contributing developers are investigating the optimal parameter set for the proposed hybrid 
consensus mechanism. 
1.3.3 Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities 
Majority Attack 
A majority attack, as described in Section 1.1.2, essentially means that an attacker can create 
valid blocks faster than the rest of the network. In PoW, controlling ​more than 50% of the 
network hashrate is enough to gain such an advantage. However, in Hybrid PoW/PoS, an attack 
has to control not only a proportion of the network hashrate, but also a proportion of the 
network’s total stake.  
12 
  
Each valid block is required to contain votes from PoS stakeholders. An attacker controlling a 
majority of the network hashpower is able to locally generate candidate blocks faster than 
others. Once this longer private chain is published, however, PoS stakeholders will start 
verifying and voting on the block where the fork began, instead of at the top of the longer private 
chain. Because the voting stakeholders are chosen randomly in proportion to how much stake 
they hold, they are theoretically unknown to the PoW miner ahead of time. Therefore, unless an 
attacker controls large proportions of both network hash power and total stake, a majority attack 
is highly unlikely to occur. 
 
Claim: In a 3-of-5 PoS voting scheme, an attacker with a fraction of the stakes, , needs tof s  
have 
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5
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4
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times the hash power of the honest network in order to gain an advantage. See proof in 
Appendix A. Refer to [15] for an analysis on generalized voting schemes. 
 
The relationship between and is illustrated inattacker s stake′network total stake
attacker s hashpower′
honest network hashpower  
Figure 2. For example, if an attacker has around 50% of the stake, he or she would also need 
100% of the honest hashpower to keep up with the honest chain. 
 
In general, the larger the fraction of ,​ the smallerattacker s stake′network total stake
 ​ratio is required to conduct a majority attack. Although buying orattacker s hashpower′honest network hashpower  
selling a large proportion of coin supply would be problematic, a majority attack may be of 
concern if stake participation drops (e.g., due to large stakepool failure or all tokens being 
mined). Generally speaking, it is important for the hybrid system to keep stake participation 
high.  See Appendix B for a majority attack cost analysis for Project PAI under the hybrid 
consensus system [17]. 
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Figure 2. PoW and PoS fraction that is required to keep up with the honest chain 
 
Nothing-at-Stake Attack 
If a PoW miner mines a malicious block in an attempt to fork, PoS validators can simply reject 
the block. Since mining the malicious block incurs computational cost, PoW miners are 
disincentivized to mine blocks that will likely be rejected by the validators. Analogously, since 
stakeholders pay for voting rights in advance, they are inclined to vote in the way they expect 
others to vote in the future (i.e., for the longest chain, which is most likely to produce a block 
reward), instead of wasting their chances on other forks. 
Stakepool 
Participating in the hybrid system’s PoS voting requires validators’ wallet software to be running 
constantly. The wallet needs to be online so that it can be called to vote — if the wallet is 
unavailable, voting opportunities will be missed, and the staker will not receive a block reward 
[19]. 
 
14 
 To accomodate stakeholders that are unable to keep their wallets constantly online, votes can 
be delegated to Stakepools. Via 1-of-2 multisig, stakepools enable users to grant permission to 
the stakepool to vote on their behalf, without giving access to the stake. 
 
Unfortunately, centralized stakepools give rise to central points of failure. It is possible that a 
stakepool delegating too many stakes could force voting a block in or out. Further, if a large 
stakepool goes offline, a large number of votes may be missed, resulting in stakes released 
without voting [20]. It is therefore generally recommended to utilize small stakepools. 
1.3.4 Other Benefits 
As noted, the hybrid system’s PoS mechanism requires wallet software to run constantly so that 
the stakeholder’s chance of voting isn’t missed. Further, since block rewards are distributed 
across PoW miners and PoS stakeholders, hybrid PoW mining is typically less profitable than 
pure PoW mining. Therefore, participating nodes tend to invest less in gaining hashpower, 
thereby lowering the barrier to entry for new PoW miners. Both of these factors help to 
encourage greater network participation. Finally, due to the potentially reduced total investment 
in hashpower, the network’s energy consumption may be relatively lower than pure PoW.  
 
In classic PoW, miners form centralized pools to improve their chances of winning blocks. The 
more hashpower a mining pool holds, the more likely it is for the pool to win a block reward, thus 
attracting more nodes to join the pool (i.e., Matthew Effect [30]). On the contrary, in hybrid 
PoW/PoS, stakepools exist solely to keep delegating wallets online, so that validators do not 
miss their opportunity to vote. The size of a stakepool has no effect on one’s chances of being 
chosen. While hybrid PoW/PoS may still result in the formation of large centralized mining pools, 
it is less susceptible to them because of the additional security afforded by the PoS layer. In 
general, the degree of centralization in hybrid PoW/PoS is expected to be less than that of 
classic PoW. 
Section 2 — Hash Functions for Proof of Work 
The goal of the choice of a Proof-of-Work hashing function is to help facilitate true 
decentralization through naturally fair public mining . An ideal candidate cryptographic hash 13
function has the following properties [21]: 
 
1. Determinism — the same input message always produces the same output hash 
2. Efficiency — computation of the output hash from any given input message is fast 
3. Security — it is infeasible to generate input messages from output hashes, except by 
brute force 
13 The authors thank Jascha Wanger of Tarnover LLC for providing a thorough outline of the implications of different 
consensus mechanisms on network security, performance and adoption.  
15 
 4. Randomness — small changes to the input message result in large uncorrelated 
changes to the output hash 
5. Uniqueness — it is infeasible to find two different input messages with the same output 
hash 
 
A hash function satisfying the above criteria is regarded ​cryptographically secure​. Further, in 
many cases, it is regarded as ideal for a blockchain if the underlying hash function is ​ASIC 
resistant​, i.e., no significant speedup in computation can be achieved by implementing the 
algorithm on an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), as compared to a CPU-based 
implementation [22]. Note that, although ​ASIC resistance​ is ideal, it is practically impossible to 
achieve in the long run (see “ASIC Resistance” section for details). 
 
See Appendix C for a table of hash functions adopted by different cryptocurrencies. 
 
The​ ​SHA-3 [31] family of hash functions has favorable properties, including : 14
● Better time efficiency relative to MD-structure hash algorithms (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2) 
● Better energy-efficiency: ​for the same level of hardness, less energy (heat) is consumed 
(dissipated) by the computation 
● Cryptographic security: it is highly unlikely that any attack, classical or quantum, would 
be discovered on SHA-3 (or on SHA-2) in the near future 
● ASIC Resistance: ASICs are currently not widely available 
 
For the PoW component of the hybrid PoW/PoS consensus mechanism in question, this 
proposal recommends considering SHA3-256, and a variant of SHA-3 called SHAKE-256 [31], 
which has similar security, but is more efficient and offers a tunable output length. 
2.1 ASIC Resistance 
Some of the hash algorithms mentioned in Appendix C are intentionally designed for ASIC 
resistance. Scrypt and Cryptonight have a large memory footprint, which reduces the gap 
between ASIC mining and CPU/GPU mining; X11 uses a sequence of eleven scientific hashing 
algorithms, increasing the cost of the required R&D to build an ASIC miner; X16R also uses a 
hash algorithm sequence, additionally disrupting the ordering of the hashing algorithms on a 
regular time basis. Despite such measures, ASICs tend to emerge for ideally ASIC-resistant 
hash algorithms (e.g., Scrypt and Cryptonight), as long as there is enough economic incentive in 
the market. 
 
In fact, there are doubts of 100% ASIC-proof hash algorithms . Further, there are debates on 15
the necessity of fighting against ASICs at all [23]. A more rational approach, toward open mining 
with minimal vulnerabilities, may be to search for a hash function with few existing ASIC miners 
14 The authors thank Prof. Thomas Vidick of Caltech for providing an assessment and summary of, and overall 
recommendation among, many of the hash functions considered here. 
15 ​Monero (XMR) suggests regularly changing the hashing algorithm (twice a year) to render existing ASICs obsolete. 
16 
 targeting it—if any at all—in combination with Hybrid PoW/PoS. A cryptocurrency is more 
vulnerable to ASIC miners at the inception stage of open mining, where such a hash function 
would help the cryptocurrency to go mainstream. After that, Hybrid PoW/PoS helps to maintain 
long-term security even with ASICs widely available. The SHA-3 family of hash functions 
satisfies this condition. Professor Thomas Vidick of Caltech strongly recommends the use of 
SHA-3 “not as part of a standalone PoW, but in combination with another approach, such as 
PoS, aimed at mitigating the possibility for 51% attacks.” 
Section 3 — Recommendation & Future Work 
3.1 Overall Recommendation 
● SHA-3’s favorable properties make it a good candidate for the Proof-of-Work component 
of the Hybrid PoW/PoS consensus mechanism. SHA3-256 and SHA-3’s variant, 
SHAKE-256, are recommended. 
○ While long-term ASIC resistance may be challenging to achieve with any choice 
of hash function, replacing PAI Coin’s current SHA-256 mechanism with an 
algorithm for which no ASIC miners already exist provides short-term protection. 
SHA-3 satisfies this condition. 
● Long-term protection against 51% attacks can be achieved by pairing a SHA-3 variant 
with a Hybrid PoS/PoW algorithm. The approach outlined in Section 1.3 addresses 
shortcomings of both PoW and PoS by requiring PoW miners and PoS validators to 
depend on each other.  
● Based on the aforementioned research and review of the state of the art, the overall 
recommendation is for Project PAI to adopt a Hybrid PoW/PoS consensus mechanism. 
This mechanism should utilize a SHA-3 variant in combination with the hybrid consensus 
mechanism outlined in Section 1.3. 
 
3.2 Future Work 
As the PAI Coin contributing developers continue their research and development on this 
approach, more technical details about PAI Coin codebase integration and rollout will be 
announced. 
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 Appendix A — Majority Attack Mathematical Proof 
An attacker with a fraction of the tickets, , needs to have times the hashf s 6f −15f +10fs5 s4 s3
6(1−f ) −15(1−f ) +10(1−f )s
5
s
4
s
3
 
power of the honest network in order to gain an advantage. 
 
Proof: 
1. = {3 or more votes are under the attacker’s control};  = {3 or more votes are underE1 E2  
honest stakeholder control};  = {the 5 voters are online}E3  
2. r[E  | E ] C  f  C  f  (1 f ) C  f  (1 f )  6f 5f 0fP 1 3 =  5
5
*  s
5 +  5
4
*  s
4
*  −  s +  5
3
*  s
3
*  −  s
2 =  s
5 − 1 s
4 + 1 s
3  
3. r[E  | E ] 6(1 ) 5(1 ) 0(1 )P 2 3 =  − f s
5 − 1 − f s
4 + 1 − f s
3  
4. On average, the attacker will generate a block after nonce attempts; honest1Pr[E |E ]1 3  
network needs  attempts1Pr[E |E ]2 3  
5. If the attacker is fast enough to compute  nonce attempts per one nonce attemptPr[E |E ]1 3
Pr[E |E ]2 3  
of the honest network, the attacker can generate the blocks at the same average speed 
as the rest of the network 
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 Appendix B — Majority Attack Cost Analysis 
We estimate the cost to attack Project PAI hybrid consensus in two parts: (1) the cost of coin 
purchase for staking in PoS, and (2) the cost of GPU acquisition for hashing in PoW. We define:  
 
Stake Ratio = attacker s stake′network total stake  
Honest Hashrate Multiplier =
attacker s hashpower′
honest network hashpower  
 
We assume honest miners own 100 NVIDIA TESLA V100 GPUs valued at $6,369 USD each 
[29] as of December 17th, 2018. This is the smallest amount of honest hashpower. Table 2 
demonstrates the attacking costs with statistics as of December 17th, 2018: 
 
Coin value of PAI Coin: $​0.052201 
Total coin supply: ​1,563,172,500 
Publicly available coin supply: 735,000,000 
 
Stake 
Ratio (%) 
Percent of 
Publicly 
Available 
Coin 
Supply (%) 
Cost of 
Coin 
Purchase 
($ Million) 
Honest 
Hashrate 
Multiplier 
Cost of 
GPU 
Acquisitio
n ($ 
Million) 
Total 
Attacking 
Cost ($ 
Million) 
18.93 40.25 15.44 19 12.09 27.54 
24.66 52.45 20.13 9 5.73 25.86 
28.99 61.66 23.66 5.67 3.6 27.26 
32.66 69.46 26.65 4 2.55 29.2 
35.94 76.44 29.33 3 1.91 31.24 
38.98 82.91 31.81 2.33 1.48 33.29 
41.86 89.02 34.16 1.86 1.18 35.33 
44.63 94.91 36.41 1.5 0.95 37.36 
47.33 100.66 38.62 1.22 0.78 39.4 
50 106.34 40.8 1 0.64 41.44 
19 
 52.67 112.02 42.98 0.82 0.52 43.5 
55.37 117.77 45.19 0.67 0.42 45.61 
58.14 123.66 47.44 0.54 0.34 47.78 
61.02 129.77 49.79 0.43 0.27 50.06 
64.06 136.23 52.27 0.33 0.21 52.48 
67.34 143.22 54.95 0.25 0.16 55.11 
71.01 151.02 57.94 0.18 0.11 58.05 
75.34 160.22 61.47 0.11 0.07 61.54 
81.07 172.43 66.16 0.05 0.03 66.19 
Table 2. Attacking Cost Table 
 
Note that all rows for which the percent of publicly available coin supply is greater than 100% 
represent situations where a majority attack is impossible.  
 
At the $0.05 PAI Coin price point, the total attacking cost—over situations for which there is a 
sufficient amount of coin publicly available to obtain the necessary stake ratio—ranges from 
$25.86 million to $66.19 million, where the attacker controls 5% to 95% of the network 
hashpower. 
 
A comparison between the cost of attacking the pure PoW-based PAI Coin network and the 
Hybrid PoW/PoS-based network is demonstrated in Figure 3.  
 
The cost of coin purchase increases linearly with PAI Coin’s value. The total cost of a majority 
attack with 18.93% stake ratio and 95% network hash power would be $86.05 million when PAI 
Coin’s value is $0.25, and $307.93 million when PAI Coin’s value is $1.00. 
20 
  
Figure 3. Attacking Cost of PoW and Hybrid PoW/PoS 
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 Appendix C — Cryptocurrency Hash Algorithms 
Hash Algorithm Hashrate Cryptocurrencies Existing ASIC 
Miners 
SHA-256 GH/s Bitcoin Cash (BCH), Bitcoin (BTC), 21Coin (21), 
Peercoin (PPC), Namecoin (NMC), Unobtanium 
(UNO), Betacoin (BET), Bytecoin (BTE), 
Joulecoin (XJO), Devcoin (DVC), Ixcoin (IXC), 
Terracoin (TRC), Battlecoin (BCX), Takeicoin 
(TAK), PetroDollar (P$), Benjamins (BEN), 
Globe (GLB), Unicoin (UNIC), Snowcoin (SNC), 
Zetacoin (ZET), Titcoin (TIT) 
 
Antminer S9, 
Antminer T9 
Scrypt KH/s Litecoin (LTC), Dogecoin (DOGE), Novacoin 
(NVC), WorldCoin (WDC), Latium (LAT), 
FeatherCoin (FRC), Bitmark (BTM), TagCoin 
(TAG), Ekrona (KRN), MidasCoin (MID), 
DigitalCoin (DGC), Elacoin (ELC), Anoncoin 
(ANC), PandaCoins (PND), GoldCoin (GLD) 
Antminer L3 
Cryptonight H/s Monero (XMR), Bytecoin (BCN), Boolberry 
(BBR), Dashcoin (DSH), DigitalNote (XDN), 
DarkNetCoin (DNC), FantomCoin (FCN), 
Pebblecoin (XPB), Quazarcoin (QCN) 
Antminer X3 
Dagger Hashimoto 
(Ethash) 
MH/s Ethereum (ETH), Ethereum Classic (ETC), 
Expanse (EXP) 
Antminer E3 
Equihash MH/s Zcash Antminer Z9 
X11 (X13, X15, 
X17) 
MH/s Dash (DASH), CannabisCoin (CANN), 
StartCoin (START), MonetaryUnit (MUE), 
Karmacoin (Karma), XCurrency (XC) 
Antminer D3 
X16R  Ravencoin, Motion(XMN)  
BLAKE-256 
(BLAKE2s) 
 Decred iBeLink DSM 6T, 
iBeLink DSM 7.2T, 
Innosilicon D9, 
Ffminer DS 19 
SHA-3 (Keccak)  MaxCoin (MAX), Slothcoin (SLOTH), Cryptometh 
(METH), NEM 
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